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This paper aims to explain that the spread of the ideology of Islamism in the Middle East in recent 
decades has led to conflict, both intra and inter-religion that continues until today. From these 
Islamist groups, Hamas Movement and ISIS provided significant effects of the conflict are. This 
study is qualitative research. Conflict Theory of John Spanier (higt-politic conflict) used to analyze 
how the two groups model of ideological construction influenced the political and economic stability 
as well as conflict in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Based on the observations of these two 
groups, it can be found that theologically, Hamas adheres to religious doctrines which prompted 
him to undertake armed resistance against Israel. At the same time, ISIS is a militant group that is 
strongly influenced by religious doctrine. However, from the aspect of rigidity doctrine and strategy 
of the movement, both groups are much different. ISIS is an ultra-radical group hostile to all other 
communities and brutally attacked the community of which he considered infidels. While Hamas 
has a more soft ideology and commit acts of violence in the context of resistance against Israeli 
colonialism.   
Keyword: Hamas, ISIS, Politic, Islamism, Global Conflict
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A. Introduction
In the latest constellation of Middle East 
conflict, after Arab Spring and until today, it can 
be found there are three civil wars raging in the 
region; First, the internal civil war within Islam 
between the Sunni radical Jihadist and Sunni 
Muslim regime; Secondly, the civil war in the 
entire region between Sunni Muslims funded 
by Saudi Arabia with Shiite funded by Iran; 
Thirdly, the civil war between Sunni Jihadis 
in Iraq and all other minorities in the region-
Yazidis, Turkmen, Kurds, Christians, Jews 
and Alawites. Various civil wars have become 
a fertile breeding ground for ISIS and other 
militant Islamist groups. In addition to the 
civil wars the Israeli-Palestinian war involving 
Hamas1 also is still happening.
The emergence of Islamic groups who are 
struggling to replace the regimes in power in 
recent years, believed to be the main source of 
future conflicts in the Middle East. The Islamist 
groups are groups that have ideological 
construction that legitimizes acts of violence 
with religious texts, or use the instrument of 
jihad to impose religious and political views 
on social entity. 2 They build an ideal of formal 
institutionalization of Islam in an Islamic 
regime. The views are forcing the Islamists to 
be struggling with the regime that is not willing 
to his power degraded, resulting in a prolonged 
conflict.3
Interestingly, Islamist groups, that is 
particularly military seeked can develop quickly 
1 Hamas is an acronym of Harakat al-Muqawamah 
al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement), founded by 
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Aziz Rantisi and others in 1987 in 
Palestine. This movement uses Islam as the basis to the 
struggle for Palestine. In 2006, this group turned into a 
powerful political faction in Palestine which opposed 
Fatah. Currently, the group still has strong support from 
the Palestinian people and believed to play an important 
role in the fight against Israel.
2 Ian O. Lesser, Bruce R. Nardulli, Lori A. Arghavan, 
“Sources of Conflict in the Great Middle East,”, (2010): 19. 
3 This issue discussed by John L. Esposito, The Islamic 
Threat, Myth of Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 23.  
and can degrade the structure of government 
that has a political and military powerful. In 
Egypt, is known that the Mubarak regime has 
a political structure that is is very strong and 
robust military infrastructure so it can in power 
more than 30 years. In Iraq and Syria, the regime 
is dominated by the Shiite network is so strong, 
but so overwhelmed when dealing with rebel 
groups who do not have political structures 
and weaponry infrastructure. In Palestine, the 
regime of Fatah must accept the harsh reality 
after he was defeated by Hamas in the political 
and military battles. 
In this context, it can be identified that 
Hamas and ISIS4 are two of the most influential 
Islamist group in the constellation of conflict in 
the Middle East and even the world as a whole. 
Before the establishment of ISIS, armed conflict 
is most common in the Gaza Strip involving the 
military wing of Hamas (Izzuddin al-Qassam) 
and the Israeli military. In the last decade, the 
conflict in the region is the most likely to cause 
material losses and victims of humanity. The 
response from the various elements toward the 
conflict was still continiou to emerge especially 
from leaders of countries in the world. After 
the founding of ISIS officially in 2013, the 
international outlook, especially observers 
and international media focused on the raging 
conflict and greater than political and military 
conflicts that occurred in the Gaza Strip. The 
reason is, the conflict in the Gaza Strip is still 
in the clear map between Israel who wants to 
employ under the Palestinian territories and 
Hamas who want to maintain a presence in a 
Palestinian state. While in Iraq and Syria who 
4 ISIS is the acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Sham), 
often called ISIL. Islamic State of Iraq was proclaimed 
by Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi in 2013. Basically, this radical 
organization founded by the leaders of al-Qaeda who are 
fighting against the Shi’ite regime in Iraq. This history has 
been much studied by experts among them Najih Ibrahim 
and Hisyam al-Najjar, al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq 
wa al-Syam: al-Sikkin allazi Tazbah al-Islam (Kairo: Dar al-
Shuruq, 2014). 
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became the battleground of ISIS, the map of 
conflict is extremely complex because it involves 
many parties and interests; ISIS, al-Qaeda, Iraq 
regime, the Syrian regime, rebel group, the 
Alliance of Shiite, Kurdish and other outsider 
interests.
Comparing Hamas with the ISIS also 
interesting from an ideological standpoint, 
because both are have roots back to the Salafi 
Jihadist ideology that is constructed by Sayyid 
Qutb and Mawdudi. Although the further 
development these two groups have many 
difference due to the views and strategies 
developed by its leaders. In essence, is almost 
all observers agreed to that the ISIS group is 
much more extreme than Hamas even though 
they both adopted the military track. Hamas 
does not consider all of that does not support 
it as an enemy, while ISIS confronted all who 
do not want to join the group. So then ISIS is 
regarded as the most dangerous terrorist group 
ever. 
In addition the Islamic State is not only a 
terrorist group. It is a political and military 
organization that holds a radical interpretation 
of Islam as a political philosophy and seeks to 
impose that worldview by force on Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. Expelled from Al-
Qaeda for being too extreme, the Islamic State 
claims to be the legitimate ruler of all Sunni 
Muslims worldwide. They have established 
what they regard as a state which includes large 
swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, governed 
from Raqqa in Syria. 
Although ISIS is an extension of the global 
jihadist movement in its ideology and worldview, 
its social origins are rooted in a specific Iraqi 
context, and, to a lesser extent, in the Syrian 
war that has raged for almost four years. While 
al-Qaeda’s central organization emerged from 
an alliance between ultraconservative Saudi 
Salafism and radical Egyptian Islamism, ISIS 
was born of an unholy union between an Iraq-
based al-Qaeda offshoot and the defeated Iraqi 
Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, which has 
proved a lethal combination.5
In this paper, there are three focus will 
be compared between Hamas and ISIS; (1) 
ideological construction, (2), strategy of 
struggle, (3), its impact on global conflict.
A. Theoretical Framework of Islamism and 
Conflict
Conflict according to Joice L. Hocker is a 
symptom that basically cannot be separated 
from human daily life, in other words humans 
from the beginning were already familiar with 
conflict and strife. The dispute is basically 
caused by a difference and misunderstanding. 
However, conflict in this sense is not the focus of 
the study because it is general and interpersonal. 
The focus of this study is violent conflicts caused 
by an ideological construction, both in the form 
of religious ideology and political ideology, as 
in the views of Hungtington, Tariq Ali, Hasan 
Hanafi, Khaled Abou al-Fadl, Abd al-Wahab 
Masiri, Bassam Tibi and others.
The discourse on conflict in this study will 
focus on conflict, as Neil A. Levine states that 
conflict is an inherent and recognized part of 
its existence in social and political life. In many 
places, conflicts due to ideological differences 
usually lead to violence, and this must be 
paid handsomely with the possibility of loss 
of human life. Conflicts can also degrade the 
government, cause chaos in the country and 
destroy people’s livelihoods. The consequence 
of a nation’s failure to resolve violent conflicts 
is a prolonged crisis. Violent conflict will 
dramatically disrupt traditional development 
and can spread to various aspects, reducing 
growth and prosperity throughout the region.6
5 Fawaz A. Gerges, “ISIS and the Third Wave 
of Jihadism”, 339. http://currenthistory.com/Gerges_
Current_History.pdf. Acessed 5 July 2015.
6 Mengenai konflik agama dan ideologi dan resolusi 
koflik, lihat Marc Gopin, “Religion, Violence, and Conflict 
Resolution, dalam Peace and Change Vol. 22 No. 1 (Januari 
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According to John Spanier, in an 
international context, conflicts can be classified 
in several forms. Among them are conflicts in 
the realm of high-politics. This form of conflict 
basically occurs related to several issues such as 
security, ideology and politics. Conflicts such 
as this show the symptom of cross-country 
competition among countries that are of global, 
regional, national and sub-national political 
sovereignty competition. In such conflicts there 
is a tendency that competition will result in the 
player who wins the absolute and vice versa 
absolutely nothing to lose. As an example of 
this conflict is the problem of Afghanistan, 
Palestine and the Syrian conflict which makes 
the Islamists as the main actors.
B. Ideological Construction of Hamas and 
ISIS: Between Fundamentalism and 
“Takfirism”
1. Hamas Fundamentalism
Hamas ideological concept can not be 
separated from the influence of the theological 
concept of religious and socio-political 
conditions in which the group is growing. 
The source that can be used as a reference in 
tracing thought Hamas is the documents that 
have been produced since the organization 
was established. The document that is very 
authoritative in explaining the ideology of 
Hamas -as mentioned before- is Charter 
produced by the leaders of Hamas at the time 
of its founding in 1988, the document known as 
Mithaq Hamas7 or Hamas Charter in 1988.8 
Ideological views Hamas as contained in the 
present Charter is the assertion that Islam is a 
system that underlies all aspects of life including 
19997), 1-31.
7 As Said by Musa Abu Marzuq, official spokeman of 
Hamas Movement, Hamas Charter in still main reference 
to the group, both in the politic and religious life. Interview 
with Musa Abu Marzuk, Cairo 10 January 2015. 
8 Many researcher and scholar derived his study to 
the movement from the Hamas Charter. See for example, 
Azzam Tamimi, Hamas Unwritten Chapter (London: C 
Hurst & Co Publisher, 2006). 
politics.9 In the theory of Islamic thought, the 
view Hamas is known as a holistic view of 
Islam because Islamic tradition serve as the 
fundamental ideology in the social and political 
life. Some of the ideological issues are clearly 
discussed in this charter including the assertion 
that Hamas adopts the doctrine of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Concerning 
Palestinian state, Hamas considers the land of 
Palestine as Islamic waqf land and inch of the 
land should not be given to other nations and 
religions, including Jews. In response to the 
Israeli Palestinian conflict, Hamas believes that 
jihad with the military track is the only way in 
the liberating Palestine. Hamas does not believe 
in diplomacy in the struggle for Palestine. This 
understanding was a mindset of Hamas in its 
early phase.10 
As the influence of Islamic a holistic view of 
the above in Article 3 of the Charter of Hamas 
explained that Islam is a method to regulate 
human life, both in the political sphere as well as 
in the social and economic sphere. Furthermore, 
in the hierarchical organization Hamas 
movement which established in December 
1987, an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood 
which was developed by the figures above. 
When explored further the two movements not 
only structurally related, moreover, objectives, 
principles and their ideology is very closely 
linked. The related ideas also can be seen from 
the statement that the Hamas movement is an 
9 Hamas was inherited the doctrine of Muslim 
Brotherhood which encourage to the establishment of 
Islamic State to implement Islamic law and tradition in 
the state istitution. See, Mulawarman Hannase, Islamisme 
dan Konflik: Perspektif Teologis dan Politis Pemikiran dan 
Pergerakan Hamas (Jakarta: Bolabatu Jaya & PSATT, 2015), 
168-170.  
10 Concerning ideological doctrine of Hamas, its 
explaination can be seen in the study of Ziad Abu Amr, 
Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim 
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994). Azzam Tamimi, Hamas, Unwritten 
Chapter. Loren D. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine: 
The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied 
Territories (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2007).
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episode of a few episodes of the struggle of the 
Brotherhood, especially in the fight against the 
Zionists.11
Jeroen Gunning, an expert on the ideology 
of Hamas viewed Hamas as a movement that 
makes Islam as a framework and political 
program, and the resources that are considered 
authoritative in regulating the state constitution 
must come from Islam.12 He says that by 
examining the basic principles of Hamas 
movement beliefs, it will be found a lot of quote 
verses of the Koran and Hadith and religious 
symbols. According to Gunning who studied 
the ideology of Hamas, the number of citations 
of the religious texts indicate that Hamas has 
a doctrine based on Islamic ideology is very 
strong. It was also pointed out that many 
religious teachings serve as the methodology 
of the life of Hamas in the social, political and 
economists.
In addition to the doctrine of the Islamic 
state, Hamas also adheres to the doctrine of 
Palestine sacrality. For him, the land of Palestine 
is essential for Muslims and may not be given to 
other communities. This distinguishes the view 
of Fatah and Hamas, which Hamas does not 
want peace talks with Israel because it considers 
the doctrine of the sanctity of Palestine derived 
from religious texts.13 The doctrine of the sanctity 
of Palestine is also associated with antisemitism 
doctrine espoused by Hamas.
Based on the assessment of the construction 
of the ideology of Hamas, it could be justified 
the assumption that this movement is a 
fundamentalist group that is heavily involved in 
the conflict. It can be seen how strong religious 
doctrine in the ideology of Hamas which 
was adopted from the previous figures of the 
political Islam.14 In addition, Hamas also seeks 
11 See in the Hamas Charter, Article 2.
12 Jeroen Gunning, Hamas ini Politic; Democracy, 
Religion and Violent (London: Hurst Company, 2007), 167.
13 Hamas Doctrine says that Palestine an Islamic waqf, 
it derived from al-Qur’an, QS. Al-Israa: 1.
14 Osama Abu Rashid and Paul Syam, “Hamas: 
to provide responses to the social and political 
problems faced since the outbreak of the first 
intifada. In many ways, Hamas provides clear 
attitude and stance how to deal with Israel, 
how its role in the Palestinian political arena 
and how to contribute to the Palestinian in the 
field of education, economic and religious. All 
doctrines are built and then try to implement 
in the concept of jihad obligations.15 Thus, 
scholars who study the ideology of Hamas as 
outlined above, Nusse, Gunning and Tamimi 
assume that Hamas is a fundamentalist Islamic 
movements involved in the Palestinian conflict 
due to the influence of religious doctrine which 
very strong.
2.	 ISIS	“Takfirism”
In contrast to Hamas, ISIS is an ultra-radical 
group that emerged in Iraq in early 2013. The 
group considers infidels (kafir) all which do not 
join the group, regarded as infidels all which do 
not want to support the concept of an Islamic 
state and does not want to pledge allegiance to 
the caliph which they appoint. Any person who 
does not pledge allegiance to ISIS and its leaders 
should be killed. ISIS also forbids democracy, 
elections, and the election of the President. They 
hostile to all leaders who are not applying the 
law of God -based understanding of them hating 
nationalists, Islamist groups which not of their 
group and forbid all state institutions. That’s 
some ideological concepts constructed by ISIS.16
ISIS essentially was organitation born from 
a group of al-Qaeda. Just as al-Qaeda, ISIS is 
Tashaddud ‘Aqa’idi wa Murunah Siyaasiyyah”, Silsilah 
Tarjamat al-Zaitunah Vol. 47, (Januari 2010): 4.
15 The resistance Ideology contructed by Hamas is a 
form of jihad doctrine that is understood by this group. 
Basically, the doctrine of jihad is understood by the Islamist 
groups in the modern age are more likely to be physically 
and militancy, thereby this understanding has been 
resulting in conflict. Mulawarman Hannase, Islamisme dan 
Konflik, 185. 
16 See detail in Najih Ibrahim and Hisyam al-Najjar, 
al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Syam: al-Sikkin allazi 
Tazbah al-Islam (Kairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2014). 
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an Islamic group that embraces the ideology of 
“takfir”. However, ISIS is more radical when it 
considers all other entities as infidels and must 
be eliminated. The group of al-Qaeda itself 
has ideological roots from “salafi jihadis” and 
“salafi Wahhabism”. As claimed by Bernard 
Haykel from Princeton University that ISIS is 
the manifestation of Wahhabism ideology.17 
The Islamic State’s (ISIS) adopted severe 
version of Jihadi Salafism is attributable to Abu 
Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi18, the founder of al-Qaeda in 
Iraq who studied theology with the prominent 
jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi19. 
The first leaders of the Islamic State, Abu Umar 
al-Baghdadi20 and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir21, 
were likewise Jihadi-Salafi stalwarts. Their 
speeches drew extensively on established Salafi 
17 Jim Eckman, “Understanding ISIS: Its Origins, Its 
Ideology and Its Context”, in https://graceuniversity.edu/
iip/2014/10/understanding-isis-its-origins-its-ideology-
and-its-context/. Acessed 5 July 2015.
18 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq 
from 2004 to 2006. He is ’Ah}mad Fad}īl an-Nazāl al-Ḫalāyla) 
was a militant Islamist from Jordan who ran a pramilitary 
training camp in Afghanistan. He became known after 
going to Iraq and being responsible for a series of 
bombings, beheadings, and attacks during the Iraq War. 
19  Abu Muhammad Aasim al-Maqdisi is the assumed 
name of Aasim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi, a Salafi 
jihadi Islamist Jordanian-Palestinian writer. He is best 
known as the spiritual mentor of Jordanian mujahid Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, the initial leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
However, an ideological and methodical split emerged 
between Maqdisi and Zarqawi in 2004 due to Zarqawi’s 
takfeer proclamations towards the Shi’a populations in 
Iraq. Maqdisi opted for a more cautious approach towards 
targeted Shi’a killings, attempting to stop Zarqawi’s radical 
ideological movement before Zarqawi’s methods become 
counter-productive. 
20 Abu Omar al-Bagdadi most commonly known as Abu 
Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi Leader of the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Mujahideen Shura Council to 2010. Very little 
is known about al-Baghdadi. It is stated that he may have 
served with the former Iraqi army as an officer during the 
Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein. 
21 His name Abu Ayyub al-Masri leader of al-Qaeda 
in Iraq from 2006 to 2010, born in Egypt, he joined the 
Muslim Brotherhood and, according to General Caldwell, 
joined Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1982, 
where he “worked with Zawahiri.” Al-Masri went to bin 
Laden’s al-Farouk camp in Afghanistan in 1999, where he 
became an expert with explosives, especially truck bombs 
and roadside bombs like those currently used in Iraq.
authorities, many of them from the Wahhabi 
tradition.
The ideology of ISIS is that of Salafist-
jihadism. It is important to remember that for 
them there is no distinction between religion 
and state. All decisions are based on a hardline 
interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), which 
is brutally enforced in the areas controlled by 
the Islamic State.22 It is also called as an Islamic 
holistic ideology derived from the religious 
texts. 
In spite from the influence of Wahhabi and 
Salafi jihadist doctrine, ISIS has a number of 
more extreme doctrines. The most prominent 
of these stipulate: all Muslims must associate 
exclusively with fellow “true” Muslims and 
dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow 
definition; failure to rule in accordance with 
God’s law constitutes unbelief; fighting the 
Islamic State is tantamount to apostasy; all 
Shi‘a Muslims are apostates deserving of death; 
and the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are 
traitors against Islam, among many other 
things. Importantly, the Islamic State anchors 
these concepts in traditional Salafi literature, 
and is more dogmatic about their application 
than al-Qaeda.23
It should be noted that although the al-
Qeda and ISIS embrace the same ideological 
doctrine, but differ in the strategy of Jihad. Al-
Qaeda still adhered to “defensive jihad” while 
ISIS embraced “offensive jihad”. Said by Fawaz 
A. Gerges, “offensive Jihad” carried by ISIS is a 
“total war” a war without knowing konpromi. 
It disdains arbitration or compromise, even 
with Sunni Islamist rivals. Unlike al-Qaeda 
Central, it does not rely on theology to justify 
its actions. “The only law I subscribe to is 
the law of the jungle,” retorted Baghdadi’s 
22 Elliot Friedland, “The Islamic State”, The Clarion 
Project: Challenging Extremism Promoting Dialogue, (May 
2015), 13.   
23 Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The 
Ideology of the Islamic State”, 10.
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second-incommand and right-hand man, Abu 
Muhammed The weakest link of ISIS as a social 
movement is its poverty of ideas. ISIS and the 
Third Wave of Jihadism  al-Adnani, to a request 
more than a year ago by rival militant Islamists 
in Syria who called for ISIS to submit to a Sharia 
court so that a dispute with other factions could 
be properly adjudicated. For the top ideologues 
of Salafi jihadism, such statements and actions 
are sacrilegious, “smearing the reputation” 
of the global jihadist movement, in the words 
of Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, a Jordan-
based mentor to Zarqawi and many jihadists 
worldwide.24
C. Hamas and ISIS Movement Strategy
1. Politic and the Military Wing
Talking about the strategy of struggle 
adopted by the Hamas movement, there are 
two phases of the development of these groups 
closely related to the strategies and patterns of 
movement. The first phase is the ideological 
phase began in the early days of its appearance 
until 2006. At this stage, Hamas adhere to 
religious doctrines inherited from its leaders 
and more involved in humanitarian activities 
in the Gaza Strip. During this period, Hamas 
avoid political channels in his strategy.
On this development, Hamas rejects all 
forms of political project to solve the Palestinian 
issue, especially political projects that benefit 
the Israelis, both in the temporary or long-term 
interests. For Hamas, to unite the Palestinians is 
the first step to further undertake the struggle 
with the mechanism of jihad in order to liberate 
the land of Palestine as a whole. Hamas rejects 
any form of dialogue with Israel that considered 
lead to the recognition of the existence of the 
State of Israel. Hamas does not want intolerant 
of the slightest Palestinian land to be given 
to Israel, so Hamas firmly reject all forms of 
24 Fawaz A. Gerges, “ISIS and the Third Wafe of 
Jihadism” 340-341.
cooperation and the interaction with Israel.25 
While in addressing Palestinian politics, Hamas 
also refused to engage in practical politics 
because it does not provide much benefit to the 
liberation of Palestine.
The second phase of the development of 
Hamas was from 2006 until today when Hamas 
transformed into the path of practical politics 
after winning the election. Hamas decided 
to participate in the election of 2006 was a 
monumental decision and shows the changes 
in the various aspects of Hamas, particularly 
in political life. Hamas participation drastically 
changed the political configuration of Palestine 
at that time. In such participation, Hamas won 
the election by winning 74 of 132 seats, while 
Fatah only gained 45 seats.26 
The change of the Hamas political direction 
that drove him to become a winner in the 
Palestinian political contestation at the time 
attracted the attention of the international 
community, especially the countries that do not 
want Hamas which is considered to obstruct the 
peace process. Even the United States considers 
Hamas victory in Palestinian politics as an 
accident and would hamper the peace process 
with Israel.27 This victory also gives a large 
effect on the Palestinian foreign aid to Hamas 
movement, especially from western countries, 
because they do not want the Islamists have a 
major influence on international policy.28
Besides getting rejection and criticism 
from outside, especially the allied countries 
of Israel, Hamas had to struggle with internal 
25 Khalid Hurub, Hamas, al-Fikr wa al-Mumarasah, 
(Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Dirasat al-Filistiniyah, 1999), 163.
26 Read in Mariam Itani, Sira’ al-Sultat baina Fatah wa 
Hamas fi Idarat al-Sultah al-Filistiniyyah (Beirut: Markaz al-
Zaitunah li al-Dirasat wa al-Istisharat, 2008), 7-8. 
27 David Makovsky, “Israeli Policy and Politics in 
the Wake of Hamas’s Victory”, dalam Robert Satloff 
(ed.), Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, 
Economy, and Strategy (Washington: the Washington 
Istitute for Near East Policy, 2006), 17-18. 
28 Jim Zanotti et.al, “Israel and Hamas: Conflic in 
Gaza (2008-2009)” dalam Nejc Kardelj (ed.), Israel Versus 
Hamas, 79.  
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political constellation. As Mariam Itani said 
that the most complex problems facing the 
Palestinians in 2006, where election held, 
not how to success of the election but how 
to deal with the post-election conflict.29 The 
conflict feared was actually happening, where 
factions who feel they have the authority to 
represent the Palestinian people, both in local 
and international sphere, has to compete with 
groups that are often labeled as radical and 
even terrorist groups, namely Hamas. Although 
the actual socio-political factors was provide 
benefits for Hamas because support for Fatah is 
decreased that caused by the inability to deliver 
good governance to the Palestinians.30
Hamas considers that in order to build 
government institutions definitely need 
extensive support from the public. Thus Hamas 
using the slogan “al-Islah wa al-tagyir”, and be 
a clear signal that the Palestinian government 
institutions requires of reform and change. For 
Hamas, waiting for state became worse and the 
people took to the streets to make a revolution 
is not the best way. Because certainly the people 
that will pay for the loss of a revolution. The 
best solution for the Palestinians is to stop 
government corruption through the mechanism 
of elections by opening the faucet freedom of 
speech to the people. It is Hamas political reform 
agenda that he feels capable to do it because it 
was have gained strong enough support from 
the Palestinian people.
Another important strategy used by Hamas 
is developing the military wing to confront 
Israel. For Hamas, the military approach and 
jihad is the most effective choice facing political 
conditions of Palestine. Military approach taken 
in the strategy of Hamas then made the Gaza 
Strip experienced a prolonged crisis. In the last 
29 Mariam Itani, Sira’ al-Sultat baina Fatah wa Hamas, 9. 
30 Jamil Hilal, al-Tandhimat wa al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah al-
Filistiniyyah, baina Maham al-Dimuqratiyyah al-Dakhiliyyah 
wa al-Dimuqratiyyah al-Siyasiyyah wa al-Taharrur (Ramallah: 
Muwatin, 2006), 52. 
decade, there have been so many times of war 
between Hamas and Israel. In 2004, a series 
of war between Israel and Hamas, as its Israel 
claimed, rocket attacks of Hamas’ military wing 
(Izzuddin al-Qassam Brigade) launched into its 
territory. In reaction to the attack, the leader of 
the IDF (Israel Defence Force) retaliated with 
air strikes and ground attacks. In the operation, 
between 104 and 133 Palestinians were killed, 
and five people on the Israeli side.31
In 2014, intense fighting between Israel and 
Hamas on a larger scale and more dangerous 
than ever in 2008-2009, on July 17 2014, Israeli 
troops entered the Gaza Strip, more than 2100 
Palestinians were killed after intensifly Israeli 
bombing of Gaza. The war ended after a 50-day 
conflict when a ceasefire was agreed on August 
26, 2014. That is some great war in the Gaza 
Strip, although many also occur in small-scale 
wars over the past decade. In each end of the 
war the Hamas has always felt and celebrated 
victory despite the casualties of Gazans far more 
than that of the Israelis.32 If observed, Hamas’s 
military strategy is more likely to be directed 
to the resistance against Israel as a form of 
patriotism to defend of his country.
2. ISIS: Total War
The Hamas view above contrasts with 
other Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and 
ISIS who adopted a purely military strategy 
and outlawing practices such as democracy 
and electoral politics. In military issues, for 
example, ISIS is a group that does not hesitate 
to kill civilians, including women. Whereas, 
in Islamic law, there is no opinion differences 
among the jurists about Prohibition killing 
civilians, women and children in war, especially 
in a state of war. They also did not hesitate to kill 
31 The chronology of the war could be acessed 
in al-Jazeera news, http://studies.aljazeera.net/repor
ts/2014/07/201471711111892808.htm. Acessed 21 February 
2015. 
32 h tt p : / / w w w . a l j a z e e r a . n e t / n e w s /
reportsandinterviews/2014/7/20. Acess 21 February 2015.
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prisoners from both Sunni and Shiite groups. 
For example, they killed one of the leaders of 
al-Nusrah brutally and spreading it through the 
video. This is clearly contrary to the teachings 
of the Prophet who forgives all prisoners in the 
battle of Badr, although they are  (Quraysh) 
hostile and persecuting Muslims.33
The Islamic State has short, medium 
and long term goals. Its short term goal is to 
consolidate the areas it already controls and 
capture more territory in Syria and Iraq. One of 
its central tactics it has used to advance its goals 
has been to precipitate all out sectarian war in 
Iraq between Sunnis and Shiites, which it tries 
to achieve by massacring civilian populations 
of Shiites whenever and wherever it can. This 
methodology is used partly due to their view 
of Shiites as heretics deserving of death and it 
is also a tactic aimed at causing reprisal attacks 
from Shiite militia groups, thus driving Sunnis 
into the arms of the Islamic State.34 
The Islamic State’s medium term goal is to 
consolidate and expand its control of territory in 
Iraq and Syria and in the next stage to advance 
into neighboring Sunni countries. It seems 
that Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be the next 
targets. Both countries have large populations 
of discontented young men and both are 
authoritarian monarchies that emerged from the 
Arab Spring relatively unscathed. Advancing in 
this way is in keeping with the Islamic State’s 
current practical approach of consolidating 
power in a contiguous territory in order to build 
a manageable and defensible state. Ultimately 
the group aims at nothing short of total world 
domination.35
The tactics employed by The Islamic State 
are the tactics of insurgency, terrorism, and 
guerrilla warfare. Most of its core leadership, 
33 Najih Ibrahim and Hisyam al-Najjar, al-Daulah al-
Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Syam: al-Sikkin allazi Tazbah al-
Islam (Kairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2014), 61-62 
34 Elliot Friedland, “The Islamic State”, 15. 
35 Elliot Friedland, “The Islamic State”, 15. 
many of whom are ex Ba’athists, have been 
involved in clandestine and violent opposition 
to the Iraqi state since 2003. Several were held 
at various times in US detention camps, and 
some escaped from Iraqi prisons during the 
Breaking the Walls campaign of the predecessor 
group, The Islamic State of Iraq, from July 2012 
to July 2013. Their combined knowledge and 
experience have made The Islamic State 3 first 
and foremost a fighting force, but, at least in its 
main urban centers, the State has also attempted 
to consolidate its territorial gains by developing 
an administrative capacity. This has meant 
that as well as attracting fighters to its ranks, 
it has also set out to build a cadre of civilian 
technocrats. It is in this area that the long-term 
weaknesses of the State are most evident. Unless 
it can maintain existing public infrastructure 
and meet demands for food, water, health care, 
sanitation and energy, and build and sustain a 
functioning economy, it will not survive.36
ISIS strategy that has been described appears 
to be very focused on the issue of strengthening 
the weapons and military training. Based on 
data on Islamist movements, this group has the 
the most powerful of weaponry and military 
capabilities. After the open support of the Arab 
world and the West against Syria, the group 
intensified military training and arming to 
winning competition with all other groups.37 
In addition, ISIS fortunate by obtain weapons 
from the Syrian army and Iraq since the joining 
of various groups within this group mainly 
from the former Iraqi and Syria army.
By the military strength, to the full 
confidence, ISIS embraced hostility strategies to 
the other groups. Shiites and Maliki government 
in Iraq as well as the Asad regime in Syria is 
the main enemy which being the target of war 
36 Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State”, the Soufan 
Group, November 2014, 9. 
37 This problem discussed in Fadi Walid ‘Akum, 
Da’ish, al-Kita al-Aswad (Kairo: Dar Amali li al-Nashr wa 
al-Tauzi, 2014). 47-50.
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initiated by ISIS. Thus, groups like the Iraqi 
army, the Shiite troops in Iraq, the Syrian army, 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Kurdish Workers’ 
Party, and the the Syrian army liberation 
coming into enemies of ISIS.38 In fact, in the 
latest development of this group they want to 
carry out an attack against soldiers of Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip.
It was reported in al-Arabiya News, ISIS 
group making trouble to the Hamas group 
in Palestine after ISIS-wing groups pledged 
to attack Hamas base in the Gaza Strip with 
the rockets on Friday, May 8, 2015. ISIS also 
previously been made Hamas upset after they 
attacked Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk, 
Syria. Some witnesses told AFP, saying that 
they heard explosions near Khan Yunis. 
However, there is no information about damage 
or casualties from the blast of the attack. “The 
group, which calls itself the supporters of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 
Jerusalem, said in an online statement that 
fired rockets intended to the base occupied by 
Hamas’s armed wing, al-Qassam Izzudin.39
ISIS brutality was also always exhibited 
in social media. This tactic is included in their 
propaganda arm. The Islamic State is well 
known for releasing extremely gruesome videos 
of it carrying out mass and individual killings, 
such as those of American journalists James 
Foley and Stephen Sotloff and British aid worker 
David Haines. This tactic is replicated in their 
online strategy, tweeting out messages across 
several different platforms to ensure maximum 
visibility and utilizing social media effectively, 
such as the use of the hashtag (#AllEyesOnISIS) 
immediately following the capture of Mosul 
by the Islamic State’s forces. This sophisticated 
messaging is an integral part of the Islamic 
38 Najih Ibrahim dan Hisyam al-Najjar, al-Daulah al-




in-Gaza.html. Acessed 10 July 2015. 
State’s operations and is quite obvious in its 
glossy English magazine, Dabiq. The name of 
the magazine is taken from a location in Muslim 
eschatology, highlighting the Islamic State’s 
millenarian appeal.40
The ISIS strategy is certainly can not be 
separated from the influence of religious 
doctrinal. In a conflict theory proposed by 
Johan Galtung, conflict is an inherent part and 
acknowledged its existence in political and 
social life. In many places, the conflict was 
much influenced by ideological differences and 
religious sects and lead to a violent conflict. 
Conflicts that were born from religious sect 
competition could degrade the government 
and create chaos in the political and social 
life order. The consequences of the lack of the 
government’s role to resolve such conflicts lead 
to the humanitarian crises in various places.41
  Such conditions also occurred in Iraq 
and Syria. At the time of the establishment of 
ISIS, the Iraqi government dominated by Shiite 
groups that the regime of President Nur al-
Maliki who came from Shi’ite Islam group was 
very repressive and discriminatory against 
Sunni Muslims. As it is known that the power 
of Shiites in Iraq today is the antithesis of the 
regime of Saddam Hussein which represents 
Sunnis and also repression against Shiites at the 
time of the ruling. This condition is exploited 
by al-Bagdadi to gain support from the Sunni 
community in order to realize its agenda that 
wants to establish an Islamic state of Iraq. 
Evidently, Bagdadi succeeded in recruiting 
thousands of militants from the Sunni Iraqi 
groups because it can trigger hostility towards 
the regime of Iraqi Shiites.
This phenomenon is in line with the views 
of Abdullah al-Baridi, that the outbreak of the 
40 Elliot Friedland, “The Islamic State”, The Clarion 
Project: Challenging Extremism Promoting Dialogue, (May 
2015): 19. 
41 Johan Galtung, Theories of Conflict: Definitions, 
Dimensions, Negations and Formations. Hawai: Hawai 
University Press, 1973.  
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conflict in the Middle East can not be separated 
from the doctrine of fundamentalism among 
Sunni and Shi’ite. What he means by Shi’ite 
Sunni fundamentalism is al-tashaddud and al-
tatarruf (fanaticism and radicalism) into practice 
of their faith and tend to regard infidels of other 
groups. Many of Shi’ite religious leaders believe 
that the Sunnis should be fought because 
they were najs (gross). For example, a Shiite 
cleric named Muhammad Sadiq said, “People 
Wahhabi were unclean, even more odious than 
a dog”.42 Nor vice versa, Sunni fundamentalist 
groups see the Shiite group extremely negative 
with regard them more dangerous than Jews 
and the state of Israel.43
Concerning “Shia fundamentalism”, many 
who reject this label mainly from the internal of 
Shia itself. The majority of Shia scholars reject 
the appearance of stigmatization that regarded 
mostly Shiite groups as “fundamentalist”. One 
of the Shia leaders in Lebanon, Ahmad Sadiq, 
reject this naming models. He did not agree 
with attempts to reconcile Shias by Sunni 
fundamentalism that is synonymous with 
radical fundamentalists. Basically, the shiite who 
do not agree with the stigmatization resisting 
the appearance of the assumption that there are 
also among Shiite radical groups or terrorists, 
as happened in the Sunni community. But in 
fact, the number of violent conflict involving 
Shiites be enough reason that part of the Shia 
community are also fundamentalist groups.44
As a result of the extremes understanding in 
both Shi’ite and Sunni, the conflict in Palestine, 
especially between Hamas, Fatah and Israel 
does not separated from the influence of the 
Shiite Sunni sectarianism. Similarly with the 
conflict in Iraq, Syria and the conflict that is 
42 This fatwa mentioned in http;//www.youtube.com/
watch?v=iqmIpJJjKrc, diupload 17/10/2010.
43 Abdullah al-Baridi, al-Salafiyyah al-Syi’ah wa al-
Sunnah (Beirut: Al-Shabakah al-Arabiyyah li al-Abhath wa 
al-Nashr, 2013),71-72. 
44 Abdullah al-Baridi, al-Salafiyyah al-Syi’ah wa al-
Sunnah, 67-77. 
ongoing today in Yemen shows the ideological 
and political rivalry between Sunni and Shiite.
D.	 Hamas	and	ISIS	Influence	Towards	Global	
Conflict
There are two issues that need to be 
addressed in the discussion are: first, how the 
influence of Islamism (Hamas and ISIS) in a 
regional context (the Islamic world), secondly, 
how Hamas and ISIS potentially engaging the 
conflict with the United da West.
 
1. Hamas: Threats Againt Arab Regimes and 
The West
In the Arab world, Hamas is basically 
considered a threat by the Arab regimes 
because they see Hamas as part of a conflict 
between Arab nationalism and Islamism. The 
new Middle East problem with the existence 
of Hamas as political factions in Palestine are 
they were no longer displayed as the Arab-
Israeli conflict, but rather interpreted as a 
conflict between Arab nationalism with the 
Islamis groups. The fact shows that almost Arab 
countries (except Syria and ally Iran) and even 
the Palestinians themselves hoped that Hamas 
should boe defeated in the Gaza Strip. Because 
they have the same interest that is frustrated to 
interact with the revolution by Islamist groups, 
especially groups after outbreak of the Arab 
Spring. Arab countries are very worried about 
the emergence of extremist groups as well as 
when they were worried to the conflict (such as 
the Kuwait war in 1991, Palestine Revival from 
2000 to 2004, and the Israel-Hezbollah war in 
2006).45 
The above reason is quite rational because 
the current Middle East problems are very 
different from the past, especially from the 
aspect of domestic politics. Currently, the Arab 
country focused on the conflict between the 
45 Khalid al-Hurub, Hamas al-Fikr wa al-Mumarasah, 
174.
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authorities and the Islamist opposition. That 
is, as an opposition group, Hamas is an ally 
of the enemies of the Arab regimes. With the 
emergence of an Islamic state in the Gaza Strip 
it will be a great inspiration for Islamists entities 
in Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab countries to 
establish the same Islamic state.46
Second, the extreme attitude of Hamas is 
thought to be a major barrier to efforts to resolve 
permanently the Israeli-Palestinian problem. 
Confrontation and conflict between the Arabs 
and Israel actually makes Arab countries 
suffered a lot. Currently attempts to reconcile 
the two states of Israel and a Palestinian state 
become an international consensus. Among 
the Arab countries, Jordan, Egypt and Syria 
have had a peace agreement with Israel. Some 
of other Arab countries have also received the 
approach to coexistence with Israel. However, 
Hamas remains in an attitude of refusal to 
recognize the state of Israel which stimulates 
dissatisfaction of Arab countries who wished 
to see the coexistence of Israel and Palestine.47 
Therefore, in the regional perspective, Hamas 
is regarded as a threat to security and political 
stability, especially for Arab leaders.
While in the context of Islamism conflict 
with America and the West, initially, the 
United States and the West does not consider 
Hamas a terrorist organization. In March 1993 
for example, the US State Forreign Affairs 
Department held a meeting with representatives 
of Hamas despite of Israel protest the meeting. 
Gradually, Americans realize that the ideology 
of the Muslim Brotherhood is very strong 
within Hamas Movement so that they have 
to take careful to interact with the goup. The 
negative perceptions of the West against 
Hamas intensified when Hamas rejected the 
46 Rubin, Barry.  “The Real Enemy of Hamas”, 
Southern Metropolis News, (2009: January 19): 11.
47 Rajab Hasan al-‘Aud al-Baba, Juhud Harakah 
al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Hamas) fi al-Intifadah al-
Filistiniyyah, 251. 
Oslo accords. After that, various military 
actions carried out by the military wing of 
Hamas against Israel in the Gaza Strip has been 
criticized by the United States. Until the victory 
of Hamas in the elections in 2006, Hamas was 
treated as a danger and labeled as a hazardous 
terrorist group in the US media. The Israeli, the 
United States, Canada, Japan and the European 
Union then agreed to consider Hamas a terrorist 
group and became a threat to the stability of 
global life.48
  
2. ISIS: Threats to The Global Security
Concerning the ISIS Islamism group, the 
question arises why the ISIS more easily able 
to recruit trans-national militants, and why 
this group became a major threat to the global 
security? Basically, ISIS success in recruiting 
his members from various countries can not be 
separated from the presence of radical Islamic 
groups in various places. Likened the plant, 
the seed is already there, so that when the seed 
was placed on arable land and stimulated by 
fertilizers and irrigation, then the seed will 
rapidly grow. When al-Bagdadi proclaimed 
the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria, almost radical groups, especially 
al-Qaeda network, perform allegiance to ISIS. 
Radical groups such as Boko Haram in Negeria, 
Anshaar Bait al-Muqaddas in Gaza (Palestine) 
and Sinai (Egypt), al-Jama’ah al-Salafiyyah li 
al-Da’wah wa al-Qitaal in Algeria, al-Shabab in 
Somalia, and other radical groups in the world 
has made support for the establishment of the 
Islamic state by ISIS and ready to dispatch its 
members to Iraq and Syria.
Although ISIS is centered in Iraq and Syria 
and plenty perform its action in both places, but 
this group also threaten global security. It can 
be seen clearly when al-Adnani call for attacks 
against the coalition and regimes. The military 
ambition of the State remains the capture and 
48 Mulawarman Hannase, Islamisme dan Konflik, 233. 
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control of further territory in Iraq and Syria, 
and the consolidation of what it already has. 
In due course it may try to move into Jordan 
and Lebanon, where it already has supporters, 
and then into Saudi Arabia, but it does not 
seem to be making plans to do more. Unlike 
al Qaeda therefore, it does not appear to have 
set up camps within its territory to attract and 
train foreign recruits to commit terrorist acts 
elsewhere. 
Although there have been several cells 
discovered abroad that have apparently 
been identifying and facilitating the travel of 
foreign fighters to join The Islamic State, which 
suggests an organized network of supporters, 
by late October 2014, no plot or attack had 
been identified outside the Levant that had 
been planned or directed from within the State, 
notwithstanding that some individuals with 
a connection to The Islamic State had been 
responsible for or involved in the planning or 
perpetration of terrorist acts elsewhere. The 
Islamic State has in any case already established 
a reputation for ruthless and indiscriminate 
violence, and it hardly need do more to turn 
the rest of the world against it. It is more in the 
administration of territory that its longevity 
will depend.49 Among the terrorist act involving 
the ISIS network was events that happened in 
France, Morocco and Kuwait.50
Similar thing manifested in Indonesia. 
Based on information from sources that writers 
get, when ISIS established, Jama’ah Islamiah (JI), 
Jama’at Ansar al-Tauhid (JAT) and other radical 
Islamic groups that exist in this country come 
to pledge allegiance to ISIS and willing to go to 
Iraq and Syria in order to strive to establish an 
Islamic state. Since then, the members of these 
49 Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State”, the Soufan 
Group, November 2014, 39.
50 In attacks to three continents, ISIS argued to be 
responsible on that’s. See al-Arabiya News “Terror attacks 
on 3 continents; ISIS claims responsibility in Tunisia, 
Kuwait” http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/26/africa/tunisia-
terror-attack/. Acessed 5 July 2015.
radical groups have managed to go to Iraq and 
Syria. To reach the two countries, the mode used 
is to first make a visit to the countries bordering 
Iraq and Syria. After that, they go into these 
countries by land with intense communication 
with ISIS groups in both countries.51
In Indonesian context, it is not easy to 
prevent the spread of the ideology of ISIS and 
its recruitment because today we are in a very 
open life networking. The openness of social 
media and easy access to international travel 
makes the government difficult to oversee the 
development of this network. The proliferation 
of social media such as Facebook, Twitter and 
WhatsAp and the large of international travel 
agency make the government must work hard 
to keep an eye on the movement of the ISIS 
network.
Thus, the most appropriate step to 
counteract the ISIS network is to strengthen 
the process of de-radicalization. It must be 
recognized that in the absence of the existence 
of radical groups in Indonesia or in other 
countries as already mentioned, then we do not 
need to be worrying about recruitment of ISIS 
in Indonesia. Evidently, they were identified 
joined the ISIS were member of the network of 
radical groups, both from a network of Solo, 
Poso and others. Therefore, all components of 
the state, government, Islamic organizations 
and the general public should cooperate to 
supervise institutions indicated teach radical 
ideologies. Because when the radical ideologies 
flourished ISIS then will be easily accepted, and 
the potential actions of terror threat the social, 
economical and political stability of Indonesia 
and all over the world.
Conclusion
To deal with the Hamas and ISIS movement 
it should be concluded in three points:
51 Presentation of Director of Deradicalisation Affairs 
(BNPT) in the Seminar about ISIS in Indonesia, Jakarta 
City Hall, June 2015.  
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First, although two movements have the 
same ideological roots, in its development, 
the thought of the two groups have many 
differences. Hamas which adopts the ideology 
of the Brotherhood does not mislead other 
Islamist groups with different views. While 
ISIS which adopted the doctrine of al-Qaeda 
embraced “takfir”, that blame all those that 
refuse to pledge allegiance and join the group 
to establish an Islamic state. In this context, 
the idea of Hamas is more moderate than ISIS 
which is considered by researchers as an ultra-
radical group. 
Second, from the aspect of movement and 
the struggle strategy, Hamas and ISIS also have 
significant differences caused by differences of 
ideology. In the latest development of the Hamas 
strategy the group has in fact accepted the 
concept of democracy and engaged in practical 
politics. The socio-political life of Hamas is very 
open and easily interacted with the various 
parties including countries and other Islamic 
groups. In contrast to the strategy of the ISIS 
movement, a group that is misleading secular 
government, democracy and nationalism 
continues to fight against the regime in Iraq and 
Syria, and Islamic groups and other minorities. 
Even Hamas also considered as deviant groups 
and a traitor by ISIS for refusing to join him to 
establish an Islamic state.
 Third, from the aspect of public 
perception and its influence on global conflict, 
Hamas and ISIS also have many differences. In 
the context of the Middle East, Hamas Institution 
acceptable by some Arab countries and Islamic 
countries, despite the ruling regimes actually 
did not expect Hamas became stronger group. 
The reason is, as the Islamist group Hamas is 
part of the opposition who take the fight against 
Arab rulers especially after the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring. As for the majority of Western 
countries, including the United States and 
Europe still considers Hamas as a banned group 
since fundamentalist ideology adopted and 
military resistance carried out against Israel. 
However, from the aspect of global conflict, 
Hamas is not a dangerous threat.
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